Baseline for trust: defining ‘new and additional’ climate funding by Stadelmann, M et al.
briefing
briefing
briefing
A promise without a baseline
Nearly 40 years ago – at the first UN environment 
summit, in 1972 – the Stockholm Declaration 
stated that ‘additional international technical and 
financial assistance’ should be made available for 
environmental protection in developing countries. At 
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, ‘new and additional 
financial resources’ were pledged to support sustainable 
development. But most of these funds have never 
been delivered.1 Both the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol 
repeated the promise of ‘new and additional’ funding 
to meet the climate mitigation and adaptation needs of 
developing nations.
With this and other promises still unmet, trust 
between North and South has eroded. According to 
most assessments, this lack of trust lay behind the 
failure to produce a treaty at the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate conference. In the run-up to the meetings, 
some European leaders made well-intentioned efforts 
to generate pledges of climate finance transfers worth 
billions of euros,2 but these pledges did not create 
the hoped-for goodwill. Meanwhile, campaigners 
Climate finance is becoming a dark curve on the road from Copenhagen 
to Cancún. Poorer nations fear that richer ones will fulfil the US$30 
billion ‘fast-start’ climate finance promises made in the non-binding 
Copenhagen Accord by relabelling or diverting basic development aid, 
or by simply delivering on past climate finance pledges. The problem is 
simple: contributor countries are operating with no clear baseline against 
which their promise of ‘new and additional’ funding can be counted – 
and they do not accept the baselines put forth by developing countries. A 
viable solution for the short term is to use projections of business-as-usual 
development assistance as baselines. The longer-term benchmark could 
be the provision of truly ‘new’ funds from new funding sources. Substantial 
up-front negotiations may be required, but seizing this opportunity to define 
baselines will build confidence on both sides and create predictability for 
future finance.
and representatives of the G77 and China bandied 
about various proposals for the minimum amount of 
climate finance the agreement should include to gain 
widespread participation. The most common figure was 
US$100 billion per year by 2020.
One hundred billion dollars a year is a lot of money: all 
official foreign aid from all sources is estimated to be 
under US$150 billion a year.3 The Copenhagen Accord, 
drawn up as a placeholder when a binding agreement 
could not be reached, attempted to meet this challenge 
by leaving open the possibility that long-term funding 
could also come from other sources:  
The collective commitment by developed countries 
is to provide new and additional resources… 
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 to 
2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation 
and mitigation. …[D]eveloped countries commit to 
a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars 
a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing 
countries. This funding will come from a wide 
variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and 
multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.
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Policy 
pointers 
n   Rebuilding trust after the 
Copenhagen climate talks 
requires clarification of the 
climate finance promises 
made there, especially on 
the baseline above which 
‘new and additional’ funding 
is counted.
n   The current lack of a 
definition (having no agreed 
baseline) is not an option 
– billions of dollars may be 
spent with no trust gained. 
The road from Copenhagen 
to Cancún requires 
international agreement 
about what ‘new and 
additional’ means.
n   Finding an acceptable 
option both for contributor 
nations and developing-
country partners requires 
that neither side will entirely 
get its way.  
n   A UN-based system is 
needed to define which 
development projects 
count as climate related 
and to monitor and review 
pledges and payments. The 
organisation should assess 
effectiveness of this massive 
flow of funds.
Here, eight options for setting the baseline of the new 
funds are reviewed – the first crucial step in measuring 
whether the North’s promises to the South are being 
met. Most of the options have 
fatal flaws, as summarised 
in the Table opposite: either 
they are vacuous, which 
would damage international 
trust, or they are too directive, 
demanding  restrictions that contributor nations would 
likely reject. Only two approaches avoid these pitfalls. 
Options for a baseline
A definition of ‘new and additional’ is important for 
mutual trust, yet hotly contested, as several reports4-8 
have acknowledged. In the end, establishing whether 
funding is new and additional demands that we 
determine what is old and established. In other words, 
the central question is ‘new and additional to which 
baseline?’9 The eight possible baselines assessed 
here vary in viability and in how well they guarantee 
a genuine boost in funding (see the Figure and Table 
opposite for an overview). 
1.  Developing countries overwhelmingly prefer that 
new and additional funding starts after countries 
have contributed 0.7 per cent of their gross 
national income (GNI) to ‘official development 
assistance’ (ODA), a measure of aid defined by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. The 0.7 per cent GNI threshold is 
also a favourite of European countries that already 
meet this ODA standard. Although this threshold 
seems crystal clear and takes into account past 
pledges by developed countries,10 it is not viable for 
two reasons. First, most developed countries will 
never accept this threshold – especially the United 
States, with around 0.2 per cent GNI going to ODA. 
Second, countries like Sweden and Denmark, which 
today exceed the 0.7 per cent mark, may just divert 
existing ODA commitments and call them new and 
additional climate finance. 
2.  At the other end of the spectrum, most developed 
countries favour having no agreed baseline, so 
that each contributor defines its own baseline. 
This option is clearly not acceptable for 
developing countries, as ‘new and additional’ 
loses any meaning. Comparing funding across 
nations becomes very difficult, and there is little 
transparency. This option prevents billions of dollars 
from having any trust-building value – and it is the 
current state of affairs.
3.  A simple option for avoiding this mess is to count 
only funding disbursed through new UN channels, 
such as the Adaptation Fund or the Copenhagen 
Green Climate Fund. Although clear, the ‘new 
channels only’ approach reduces flexibility for 
contributors and potentially leaves them less 
willing to use the term ‘new and additional’. Some 
existing channels may be better suited for certain 
types of flows or certain efforts to address climate 
change. A variant that may be more acceptable to 
developed countries is to consider all new kinds of 
funds. This approach, however, could have absurd 
consequences if old commitments are redirected 
into new funds. 
4.   Another straightforward option would allow for 
using the best channels and mechanisms, but 
would not count ODA money as climate finance, 
to clearly separate between development and 
climate funds. Double-counting could be avoided 
and transparency enhanced. This approach forces 
contributors to decide whether the main goal of 
funding is development or climate related. Despite 
the advantages of this approach, it is rejected by 
most industrialised countries.
5.   A baseline acceptable to contributors may be current 
climate finance: the existing funds and those pledged 
before Copenhagen would define the unchanging 
baseline. (This could be a five-year average from 
before Copenhagen, 2004-2008.) On the downside, 
diversion of development-oriented aid is possible, 
and it is difficult to distinguish between old and 
new finance (see ‘Are the CIFs new and additional?’ 
below). Another crucial point for this option and 
several others is that of inflation. Are baselines set 
in inflation-adjusted currencies? If not, then future 
promises are a fraction of what developing nations 
would otherwise expect to receive. 
6.   As a compromise between options 4 and 5, one 
could assess how much foreign assistance countries 
would be expected to provide in any given year, 
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Are the CIFs new and 
additional? 
The Copenhagen Accord includes fast-track 
climate finance for 2010-2012; however, it does 
not say whether this novel funding includes the 
vast sums that were pledged to the World Bank’s 
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) in 2008 but were 
mostly not paid by the time of the Copenhagen 
negotiations in December 2009. It may be very 
tempting for the wealthier nations to argue that the 
CIFs are there ‘to bridge the financing and learning 
gap between now and a post-2012 global climate 
change agreement’ (to quote the Bank)11 and 
therefore are part of new and additional fast-track 
funding. But past CIF pledges cannot be regarded 
as ‘new’ by the most common definition (‘funds 
which are separate from those that have already 
been promised’)12.
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in the absence of new climate finance. If updated 
projections of development aid were used as a 
baseline, business-as-usual funding levels would be 
renegotiated every year, taking into account current 
economic growth and ODA commitments. This 
option may be more acceptable to contributors as 
it allows future spending on climate finance to drop 
during economic downturns. Of course, obligations 
would also increase in boom years. Although 
this method is theoretically close to the perfect 
assessment of ‘new and additional’, in practice it 
would be difficult to negotiate – and it might fail to 
create trust between parties, as developed countries 
will always be suspected of fixing the baseline. 
7.   A baseline of predefined projections of development 
aid would avoid this permanent renegotiation by 
defining the projected business-as-usual level of 
ODA in advance, according to a realistic growth 
path for ODA. The predefinition task would create 
a debate on which ODA growth path is most 
realistic. Industrialised countries may be concerned 
about agreeing to specific levels of development 
aid and climate finance without knowing their 
future GDP growth and related tax income. It is 
straightforward, however, to use a formula that 
takes into account real GDP growth in later years. 
The GDP dependence of the funds would be a 
downside for developing countries, but by avoiding 
renegotiation of the formula they would benefit from 
better predictability. 
8.   A final solution combines all issues: newness, 
additionality and acceptability. This baseline 
would count new sources only, meaning that only 
assistance from novel funding sources – such as 
international air transport levies, currency trading 
levies or auctioning of emission allowances – 
would be seen as new and additional. Such funds 
are new by definition, and they are likely to be 
additional to ODA, as it is highly improbable that 
new funding instruments – especially the ones 
related to climate change – would be used for 
development aid without a climate policy regime. 
The obvious drawbacks are that it inflexibly bars the 
use of effective current funding streams, and would 
arbitrarily define which sources are new. Although 
we believe that this baseline could be acceptable 
for contributors, they have ruled it out for 2010-
2012 fast-track financing, which will mainly draw 
on existing sources such as the general budget.13 
Therefore, the ‘new sources only’ option is probably 
one for longer-term (post-2012) climate finance.
Of these possible baselines, the last two are most worth 
pursuing. They steer clear of the extremes of being too 
overbearing or too loophole-ridden. Perhaps most to be 
avoided is the current path of having no agreed baseline, 
so that billions are spent but no trust is gained. 
Option Advantages Disadvantages
1.  
Above 0.7% of GNI
• Objective criterion
• Based on past ODA pledges
•  No pressure on countries above the 
threshold
•  Countries very far from the threshold 
(e.g. the US) likely to ignore the 
criterion
   Too directive?
2.  
No agreed baseline
• Acceptable for most contributors •  No comparability of commitments and 
disbursements
•  Even low pledges can be labelled as 
major
•  Front-runners do not get recognition 
   Vacuous 
3. 
New UN  
channels only
•  Objective criterion
•  Proportion of contributors vs recipients 
on UN boards is about equal
•  Existing mechanisms may be more 
suited for certain purposes
•  Diversion of ODA still possible
•  Contributors provide only token 
contributions
   Too directive 
4.  
No ODA counts
•  Objective criterion
•  Relabelling of aid as ‘climate finance’ 
is avoided
•  Likely unacceptable for most 
contributors
•  Old ODA funding sources may still be 
used
   Too directive 
5.  
Above current 
climate finance
•  Acceptable for contributors •  Diversion of ODA still possible
•  Requires controversial decisions on 
whether projects are climate  
related14,15 
   Vacuous?
6.  
Above updated 
projection of 
development aid
•  Technically correct definition •  Hypothetical, very difficult to assess, 
very contested  
•  Diversion of ODA still possible
   Vacuous 
7. 
Above predefined 
projection of 
development aid
•  Objective criterion after being defined
•  Predictability of funds
•  Definition of baseline will be contested 
•  Diversion of ODA still possible but not 
likely 
   Workable short-term option
8.  
New sources only
•  Newness appears guaranteed
•  Additionality likely
•  Contributors are restricted in their 
choice of instruments and may reduce 
funding
•  Not clearly objective in some cases
   Workable long-term option?
   
Figure. A continuum of baseline options
Table. The eight options
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Baselines and climate justice
Developing countries must adapt to climate 
impacts they barely had a hand in creating. In 
these countries climate finance is often seen as 
compensation for damages caused by past and 
present greenhouse gas emissions of industrialised 
nations. Thus, efforts to address the issue of climate 
justice hinge on assistance with adaptation, as 
well as on reducing emissions sharply. And without 
agreed baselines for what counts as new and 
additional funding, a clear sense of justice  
cannot emerge.
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The way forward: baselines 
attached to pledges
Even with the best-defined baseline, new and additional 
funds are not guaranteed. For this, clear rules on 
monitoring, reporting and verifying of funds are needed. 
Initially, it may be beneficial for both contributors and 
recipients to monitor pledges and disbursements, and 
report findings to a central entity (preferably a UN 
body or other independent registry). The information 
should then be verified according to rules pre-agreed 
by the UN. If information from contributors and 
recipients becomes very similar, monitoring and 
reporting could be unified. Creating a global accounting 
framework for finance will be essential, not only to 
ensure the additionality of funds but also to delineate 
public funds from carbon market funds, evaluate the 
grant equivalence of loans16 and prepare results for 
enforcement mechanisms.
It is generally preferable to define the baseline first, before 
pledges are made: this can prevent developed countries 
from endlessly renegotiating and adjusting the baseline, 
both of which hamper trust-building. As we already 
have pledges without a baseline after Copenhagen, a 
viable solution would be to prepare parties to agree on 
a baseline at the Cancún conference in 2010, as well 
as to set a deadline this year for contributors to define a 
clear baseline for their Copenhagen pledges. Later, the old 
pledges could be translated into pledges with a unified 
baseline, and new commitments would have to use  
that baseline. This would be a first step towards  
mutual trust and accountability, and a clear effort 
towards addressing climate justice (see ‘Baselines  
and climate justice’, above).
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